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Introduction 
 
 
The Corporate body, as traditionally recognised in the British and 
Irish jurisdictions, evolved during the industrial revolution of the 18th and 
19th centuries. The first modern form of a company was described in the 
Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, with companies having being granted 
the privilege of limited liability a year earlier, under the Limited Liability 
Act 1855.1 The company was designed to meet the requirements of the 
business culture prevalent in those jurisdictions at that time, with the 
resulting concepts and corporate design continuing to inform academic 
debate and legislative practices at the dawn of the 21st century. 
 
Similarly, the corporate entities and legal persons which evolved in 
our EC partner member states were designed to meet the needs of their 
own particular jurisdictions and to counter the particular economic and 
political environment of their own time and place. The corporate entities, 
which now dominate the commercial landscape of Western Europe, are 
many and diverse. To date, corporations have been creatures of their own 
legal jurisdictions, and have not ventured abroad, to other jurisdictions, 
except perhaps in the guise of branches, with the more substantial aspects 
of international corporate behaviour being dealt with by way of a 
subsidiary being registered in the other country, and being wholly subject 
to the corporate law of that country. With the advent of globalisation, 
however, and with the growth in numbers of multinational companies, the 
international perspectives of corporate law have come to the fore. This 
development has been added to by the continuing drive at a European 
level for closer integration of the laws of the member states of the EC, 
pursuant to the European Community’s objectives. 
 
The European Community, pillar 1 of the European Union2 is the 
source of the current programme for European Corporate harmonisation. 
The European integration dynamic is based on the Treaty of Rome 1957, 
as amended, whose overriding impetus has been; 
1. the promotion of free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital, 
2. the development of a Common Commercial Policy, and, 
                                                          
1
 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Butterworths. 
2
 since the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty 1992. 
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3. the development of European Competition Law, with many of the 
other policy areas currently being developed by the EC being seen as 
ancillary to the aforementioned policy objectives.3 
 
Since the inception of the EC, the pace of European integration has 
been quickening rapidly, albeit from a slow start, with a wide range of 
matters, such as car number plates,4 having been seen as fair game for the 
integration process, until the passing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992,5 
which, for the first time, included within European Law, the principle of 
subsidiarity, with the allied principle of proportionality. 
 
The concept of Subsidiarity is now enshrined, to the extent that it 
affects pillar 1 of the EC, in Article 5.6 This article recognises that the 
Community must “act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it 
by the Treaty and the objectives assigned to it herein”. The article goes on 
to say, however, that  
“in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore 
by reason of the scale of effects of the proposed action, be better achieved 
by the Community”. 
 
While this issue of whether the aforementioned article is legally 
enforceable, together with how best to prove a case under this article, as 
opposed to merely using it as an administrative or political tool, remains 
outstanding, the application of the concept of subsidiarity to the area of 
Corporate law is worth examining. While it may be within the exclusive 
competence of the EC to take measures in pursuit of the goals of free 
movement, the Common Commercial Policy, and in the development of a 
Competition policy, Corporate law harmonisation is not within the 
exclusive competence of the EC. To the extent that Corporate law 
harmonisation is within its competence, this is a shared competence with 
the member states, and any initiatives taken by the EC, after the coming 
into force of the Maastricht treaty, could be subject to the subsidiarity 
provision. This has been reflected in the writings of some academics,7 
                                                          
3
 “A Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity”, AG Toth in “Legal issues of the Maastricht Treaty”, edited by O 
Keeffe and Twomey, Wiley Chancery, 1994. 
4
 “Subsidiary: Principle and Practice”, Tom Burns, Lecturer in Law, Napier Univeristy, (1995) Scots 
Law Times 67. 
5
 Otherwise known as the Treaty on European Union 1992. 
6
 Post Amsterdam. 
7
 “European Company Law –Towards Democracy?” Charlotte Villiers, European Business Law 
Library, Ashgate, 1988. 
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and should be kept in mind when examining the possible future routes for 
development of the Company law harmonisation programme. It is 
interesting to note that the main corporate law harmonisation provisions 
currently enacted have all been enacted prior to the coming into force of 
the Maastricht treaty.  
 
 
Harmonisation to date 
 
 
The legal bases utilised for the EC corporate law harmonisation 
programme, which to date accounts for nine corporate law directives in 
force,8 and four pending,9 are the right of establishment provisions in the 
Treaty of Rome, Articles 43 to 48.10 In addition, Article 29311 provides 
for the enactment of provisions to facilitate the mutual recognition of, 
inter alia, companies, to include “the retention of legal personality in the 
event of transfer of their seat from one country to another, and the 
possibility of mergers between companies or firms governed by the laws 
of different countries”. The transfer of a company from one jurisdiction to 
another became an issue in the Daily Mail case,12 which will be referred 
to later. 
 
The European Corporate harmonisation programme has been 
classified by academics,13 into four generations,14 with some of the 
directives being precise in their requirements, and others taking a 
minimalist approach. The first generation of directives15 is perceived as 
being prescriptive, having been heavily influenced by the Germanic style 
of law making. The second generation of directives16 attempted to 
facilitate the “different approaches of the Member States and business 
                                                          
8
 See Schedule attached hereto. 
9
 The draft fifth directive, the per-draft ninth, draft tenth and draft thirteenth directive. 
10
 Ex. Articles 52 to 58 EC Treaty. 
11
 Formerly Article 220 EC Treaty. 
12
 R v. HM Treasury and others ex parte. Daily Mail and General Trust plc. [1989] 1 All ER 328. 
13
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 7. 
14
 As per Heinrich Siedentopf, “The Implementation of directives in the Member States” in Heinrich 
Siedentopf and Jaques Ziller (eds.) “Making European Policies work: The Implementation of 
Community Legislation n the Member Sates, Vol. 1” (Sage, London, 1988,) 169, at pp. 172-73, quoted 
in “European Company Law –Towards Democracy?” Charlotte Villiers, European Business Law 
Library, 1988. 
15
 The First and Second Corporate Law directives. 
16
 To include the Accounts directives, while the Third and Sixth directives tend to show the 
characteristics of the first generation, rather than the second generation of directives. See “European 
Company Law –Towards Democracy?” Charlotte Villiers, European Business Law Library 
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practices” with the “German influence” becoming “less obvious”.17 The 
third generation of directives have been classified as being the “new 
approach directives”,18 with a focusing on “what is to be achieved rather 
than how” that was to be achieved. The “third generation” tend to be 
fairly short, as in the case of the Twelfth Directive, which contains only 
nine articles, leaving details to be fleshed out by way of national 
implementation by the member states.19 The latest generation is the 
“fourth generation” of directives, which encompass the draft thirteenth 
directive on take-overs,20 having being referred to as “framework 
directives”. 
 
A difference in approach amongst the directives can however been 
identified, with the third and sixth directives, both being classified in the 
same generation, but exhibiting radically differing approaches. The third 
directive, dealing with mergers, “goes beyond co-ordinating existing 
laws”,21 while the sixth directive, dealing with divisions of companies, is 
not even obligatory,22 and if implemented by a member state, merely co-
ordinates national provisions. 23 
 
It is worth noting that while “companies” covered by Article 58 of 
the EC Treaty is broad in scope,24 the harmonisation programme has 
evidenced a keen interest, firstly, in public limited companies and 
secondly in private limited companies.25 With the sole exception of the 
twelfth company law directive, all the directives have either been 
exclusively concerned with public limited companies,26 or both public 
and private limited companies.27 Other types of companies, such as 
unlimited companies, have not been addressed at all. 
 
                                                          
17
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 7. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 of the 16th February 1989, [1985] OJ C 64/8. 
21
 Op. Cit. footnote no. 7. 
22
 this apparently has been accounted for by Adolfo Sequeria Martin  in “La Fusion y La Escision: 
Tercera y Sexta Directivas” in E Garcia de Enterria et al (eds), “Tratado de Derecho Comunitario 
Europeo, vol III” (Civitas, Madrid, 1986) 27, at p. 29 (quoted by Charlotte Villers in “European 
Company Law –Towards Democracy?” European Business Law Library, 1988, on the basis that “The 
non-imperative character of the Sixth Directive is influenced by the fact that divisions are much more 
scarcely implemented in practice, and their tax implications as well as their theoretical distinctions 
would make it much more difficult to impose them in an obligatory manner”. 
23
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 7. 
24
 “not being restricted to specific legal structures or to specific categories of owners and shareholders”, 
in “The Commission’s Programme for Company Law Harmonisation: The Winding Road to a Uniform 
European Company Law?” Gisbert Wolff, “EC Financial Market Regulation and Company Law”, 
Mads Andences and Stephen Kenyon-Stade, Sweet and Maxwell, 1993. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Second, Third and sixth directives. 
27
 First, forth and seventh directives. 
 7 
While it is recognised that different national standards may “impair 
comparability, increase the cost of cross-border transactions, and impede 
establishment or distort competition”,28 necessitating some form of 
harmonisation, the current European Corporation programme, while 
utilising directives, appears to have not merely a harmonisation effect, but 
often results in an upwards harmonisation, or unification of particular 
areas of law pertaining to companies. While some academics believe that 
the use of directives, as opposed to regulations, of itself, “reflects a desire 
to accommodate the different economic and cultural contexts” 29 of the 
various jurisdictions within the EC, Schmitthoff’s perceives30 that the 
directives have been written in such a way as to lead to the “virtual 
unification of national company laws under the guise of harmonisation.”31  
 
It is necessary to observe that the European Commission does not 
have the authority to pursue the unification of the laws with respect to 
companies, as an end objective, but rather any harmonisation “should be 
directed towards achieving the Treaty’s objectives”.32 In so doing any 
such initiatives taken after the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty 
will be subject to the principle of subsidiarity currently enshrines in 
Article 5 of the EC treaty.  
 
The potential emergence of “culture”, pursuant to Article 151 EC, 
as a fully-fledged legal concept could also have a bearing on corporate 
culture in the context of harmonisation. The ECJ has already utilised the 
culture concept in other contexts, such as in the protection of the French 
film industry from the provisions dealing with the free movement of 
goods in the Cinéthèque case,33 and the Federación de Distribuidores 
Cinematográficos34 case. Given that the concept of culture, which was 
inserted by Article 128 TEU also appears in the Amsterdam Treaty, could 
indicate that this is a concept which is waiting in the wings. 
 
Equally, any move to respect the subsidiarity provisions must 
avoid creating a repetition of the “Delaware effect” suffered in the United 
States, which arose as a result of incomplete uniformity of the states laws. 
                                                          
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 7. 
30
 quoted by Villiers, Op. Cit. Footnote no. 7. 
31
 Clive M. Schmitthoff (ed.) “The Harmonisation of European Company Law” (UKNCCL, London, 
1973) 
32
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 7. 
33
 Joined Cases 60 and 61/84 Cinetheque v. Generation Nationale des Cinemas Francais [1985] ECR 
2603 [1986] 1 CMLR 365. 
34
 Federación de Distribuidores Cinematográficos v Estado Español et Unión de Productores de Cine 
y Televisión, Case C-17/92. 
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The Daily Mail judgement35 is a case in point. To date there appears to 
have been no “pronounced or observable “Delaware effect” across 
Member States” of the EC, but as has been pointed out be Wolf, “the 
tightening of requirements imposed upon pubic limited companies may 
well have increased the attractiveness of private limited companies, 
especially for small and medium-sized undertakings.”36 
 
 
The Fifth and Thirteenth directives 
 
 
The most ambitious aspects of the European Corporate 
harmonisation programme to date, are those directives which are not yet 
in force, namely the proposed fifth, ninth, tenth and thirteenth 
directives.37 Both the fifth and thirteenth directives have proven to be 
highly controversial, and have gone through many draft stages, with the 
ninth and tenth barely getting off the starting blocks. These draft 
directives are highly ambitious, with their aim being to introduce into 
some member states the corporate culture of other member state, and 
there in lies the problem. 
 
The draft fifth corporate law directive contains within it many 
controversial issues, amongst them the mandatory introduction of the 
“one share, one vote” principle.38 The most controversial aspect however, 
is the proposed participation of workers in the decision making process of 
the company.39 The objective of the fifth company law directive is to 
“require employee participation in public limited companies which (alone 
or with subsidiaries) employ 1,000 or more persons.” This representation 
of employees by way of worker directors, works councils, or by way of 
“a system established by collective agreement”.40 The directive initially 
required a two-tier management structure, following the Germanic 
tradition, with the company being “managed by a management organ 
                                                          
35
 R v. HM Treasury and others ex parte. Daily Mail and General Trust plc. [1989] 1 All ER 328. 
36
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 24. 
37
 The draft fifth directive seeks to regulate the structure of companies, to include the issue of worker 
participation, the pre-draft ninth directive proposes to deal with the transparency of relationships 
between enterprises, and the tenth draft directive deals with the transparency in mergers and 
acquisitions throughout the Community, by extending the application of the 3rd directive to cross 
border mergers and acquisitions. 
38
  Op. Cit. Footnote no. 24. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 CCH – British Company Law and Practice, 1997 CCH Editions Limited.(CD Rom) 
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under the supervision of a supervisory organ”.41 The third draft of this 
directive, however, has made allowances for the unicameral board of 
directors in use within the UK and Ireland. 
 
The draft tenth directive on cross-border mergers by public limited 
companies has only ever reached the first reading in the European 
Parliament, due to its parallel requirements for worker participation,42 
while the proposed ninth directive, on the transparency of relationships 
between enterprises, has suffered an ever worse fate, having only reached 
the pre-draft stage. 
 
It had been envisaged that the draft fifth company law directive 
would be complimented by the European Works Council Directive 
1994,43 which has already entered into force pursuant to the European 
Labour law programme. However, with the delay in the implementation 
of the fifth corporate law directive, and with no enactment date currently 
in sight, the resulting half way harmonisation of law in a specific area 
may of itself hamper the “restructuring of industries within the internal 
market and reduce the mobility of companies.” 44  
 
 
The draft thirteenth directive on Take-Overs 
 
 
The proposed thirteenth corporate law directive deals with 
company take-overs, and falls into the fourth generation of directives 
referred to earlier. In compliance with the requirements of subsidiarity it 
sets out principles, leaving to the member states the manner of their 
application in accordance with “their national systems and their cultural 
contexts”.45 It straddles what in some jurisdictions is classified as 
company law, but in other jurisdictions is classified as securities law. The 
thirteenth directive emanates from the commission’s unit which deals 
with “company law, industrial democracy and accounting standards” 
while the complimentary issue of insider trading is covered by way of a 
directive which emanates from the “Commission’s unit covering stock 
markets and securities”.46  
                                                          
41
 “Corporate Law The European Dimension”, Forward by the Right Honourable The Lord Mackay of 
Clashfern, the Lord Chancellor, Butterworths 1991. 
42
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 24. 
43
 Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994. 
44
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 24. 
45
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 7. 
46
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 24. 
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The proposed directive has to be evaluated in the context of the 
differing cultures of the EC, which has resulted in the predominance of 
company take-overs occurring within the United Kingdom, with other 
member states of the EC utilise a “fusion model for amalgamation of 
companies”.47 Other differences in corporate cultures between the UK 
and most of the rest of Europe need to be taken into account. On 
mainland Europe issues such as the relatively small number of companies 
listed on the various national stock exchanges, the “ small proportion of 
shares that are publicly traded”, with most shares being “retained in 
private hands”, the greater use of bearer shares, together with the “greater 
use of debt financing” and “relatively little equity financing”48 result in an 
imbalance in impact of the draft thirteenth directive on the member states 
of the EC. 
 
The thirteenth directive attempts to harmonise an activity which 
predominantly occurs within the United Kingdom, and whose 
implementation would make the work of the City’s Take-over panel 
effectively redundant. Much of the academic debate within the United 
Kingdom in this area has concerned the relative merits and demerits of 
the Take-over panel vis a vis the proposed provisions of the thirteenth 
directive. The City Take-over panel, a self-regulatory system for the 
city’s take-over code, covers “take-over and merger transactions, 
however effected”,49 where “the acquisition candidate is a public 
corporation, listed or unlisted, and considered resident in the United 
Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, or actually resident in 
the Irish Republic and listed on the Stock Exchange or its Unlisted 
Securities Market.50 
 
While the proposed draft directive is modelled on the UK Take-
over code,51 albeit with some structural weakness, which could yet be 
addressed, the directive, by its nature, proposes to provide a regulatory 
system based on the rule of law. The Code, in contrast has always 
operated in a non-legal context, while recognising pursuant to Datafin52 
and Guinness,53 the need to be subject to judicial review. It provides a 
                                                          
47
 “The Draft thirteenth EC Directive on Take-overs”: L.S. Sealy in “EC Financial Market Regulation 
and Company Law”, Mads Andences and Stephen Kenyon-Slade Sweet and Maxwell, 1993 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 City Code, Introduction, paragraph 4(a) and (b). 
50
 “The Proposed Thirteenth Directive on Take-overs: Unravelling the United Kingdom’s Self-
Regulatory Success?” Dr. Stephen Kenyon-Slade and Mads Andenas, in “EC Financial Market 
Regulation and Company Law”, Mads Andences and Stephen Kenyon-Slade Sweet and Maxwell, 1993 
51
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 47. 
52
 R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p. Datafin plc [1987] QB 815 . 
53
 R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p. Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 140. 
 11 
quicker, cheaper, and more flexible method of regulation,54 which could 
not be matched by a system “based on legal rulings”.55 This flexibility is 
particularly of relevance in the context of hostile take-over bids, often 
effected by way of dawn raids. Concern has been expressed that the 
implementation of the draft thirteenth directive could give rise to 
litigation being utilised as a delaying tactic in take-over situations. 56 
 
The proposal of the draft thirteenth directive, when examined 
through the lens of the subsidiarity provisions of Article 5 exhibit some 
serious flaws. National provisions for regulating take-overs are already in 
place within the UK, to cover both internal take-over situations, and the 
take-over of a UK company by a non-UK company. It can therefore be 
argued that it would be incorrect to say that “the proposed action cannot 
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by 
the Community”.57 It is respectfully suggested that the proposed 
thirteenth directive, along with the fifth, ninth and tenth directives, now 
fall foul of the subsidiarity provisions, and that the programme of 
Corporate Harmonisation has reached an awkward, if not insurmountable 
road block. The question of whether the British government wishes to 
make UK companies more vulnerable to hostile take-overs than the 
companies on mainland Europe is, of course, a separate issue. 58 By way 
of an aside, the potential future argument of differing corporate cultures 
could, at some point in the future, come into play in this situation. 
 
 
Corporate governance 
 
 
Another issue which is currently being debated at an international 
level is the issue of Corporate Governance. The current debate has been 
reflected in the UN Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations 
1982.59 This document operated by way of a preliminary examination as 
to the nature of companies, recognising that the models developed to 
meet the needs of the Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries 
                                                          
54
 This is very important in the context of dawn raids, where time is of the essence. 
55
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 47. 
56
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 47. 
57
 Article 5 EC Treaty. 
58
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 47. 
59
 in effect a resolution of the UN General Assembly, initiated by the UN Commission of Transnational 
Corporations, with the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations acting as its secretariat. 
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no longer satisfactorily meet the needs of society or business on the verge 
of the 21st century.  
 
Corporations are still artificial legal entities umbilical tied to one 
legal jurisdiction, owned by shareholders, who appoint directors, whose 
sole overriding objective is to make money, albeit within the confines 
imposed by the legal jurisdiction to which they are tied. An examination 
into the nature of the obligation a company is perceived to owe, or is felt 
it should owe to “shareholders, workers, creditors, consumers and the 
public at large”,60 recognising that a company is a creation of law, 
granted the privileges of incorporation by a State, which cannot be left to 
override valid competing claims from other sectors of society. As one 
academic has put it so eloquently,  
 “What .. we are afraid of is that this powerful machine, which so 
successfully grinds out the goods we want, seems to be running without 
any discernible controls. The young lad mastering the technique of his 
bicycle may legitimately shout with pride “Look Ma, no hands” but is 
this the appropriate motto for a corporate society?”61  
 
It is possible that the European Community, which is particularly 
sensitive to international law developments, will, at some stage attempt to 
reflect the development of thinking in this area through its corporate 
harmonisation programme, and member states which are less radical in 
outlook, may come under pressure to amend their legislative provisions 
accordingly, although such attempts could also come under scrutiny from 
a subsidiarity context. 
 
 
Daily Mail 
 
 
The current situation of European Corporate Law harmonisation, of 
itself, is throwing up some interesting arguments, some of which have 
already come to court in the guise of R v. HM Treasury and others ex 
parte. Daily Mail and General Trust plc.62 This case was an attempt by 
                                                          
60
 Allen, “Socialising the Company”. Referred to in “Perspectives of Corporate Governance”, Dr 
Saleem Sheikh and Professor SK Chatterjee, in “Corporate Governance & Corporate Control”, 
Saleem Sheikh and William Rees, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1995. 
61
 Mason, “The Corporation in Modern Society” referred to in “Perspective on Corporate 
Governance”, Dr Saleem Sheikh and Pofessor SK Chatterjee, in “Corporate Governance & Corporate 
Control” Saleem Sheikh and William Rees, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1995. 
62
 [1989] 1 All ER 328. 
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the Daily Mail newspaper to exploit the lower taxation rates applicable to 
Corporate Capital Gains in the Netherlands, at the expense of the British 
Inland Revenue. 
 
The Daily Mail case arose from a valiant attempt to utilise the 
provisions of the EC Treaty, namely Articles 4363 read in conjunction 
with Article 48 EC.64 The argument in this case was that a legal person65 
is equally entitled as a natural person to exercise the right to free 
movement within the European Community.66 Accordingly the Daily 
Mail plc, having being registered in the UK, should have the right, 
without any controls, to move to the Netherlands to work. This situation 
would be facilitated by reason of the fact that the UK recognised a 
company on the basis of its siege statutaire,67 while the Dutch authorities 
utilised the siege real test, for taxation purposes,68 (while also utilising the 
siege statutaire for Corporate Law purposes). However, UK fiscal law 
requires a company to have its centre of management and control within 
the UK, while Dutch law will allow a company to establish itself in the 
Netherlands by locating its central management and control there, without 
being registered in that country, and thereby acquiring Dutch nationality. 
 
The ECJ heard the matter by way of, what was then, an Article 
17769 reference from the High Court in London. The ECJ found that in 
the present state of Community law, the current numbered Articles 43 and 
48 of the EC Treaty, conferred no right on a company incorporated under 
the legislation of a member sate and having its registered office there to 
transfer its central management and control to another member state.70 It 
would appear therefore that EC secondary law does not as yet facilitate 
that which is clearly provided for in the EC treaty. Equally, the ECJ 
utilised the term, “present state of Community law”. The possibility of 
Community law developing to permit such an operation at some time in 
the future is not ruled out. 
 
 
                                                          
63
 Formerly Article 52 EC 
64
 Formerly Article 58 EC. 
65
 As long as it is not a non-profit making entity. 
66
 Pursuant to EC Council Directive 73/148. 
67
 Recognition of a Company as being within the jurisdiction by reason of it being registered within the 
jurisdiction. 
68
 Recognition of a Company as being within the jurisdiction by reason of it having its principle place 
of business or centre of management within the jurisdiction. 
69
 Currently an Article 234. 
70
 And that EC Council Directive 73/148 conferred no right on a company to transfer its central 
management and control to another member state. 
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New corporate structures 
 
 
As referred to earlier, the European Corporate Harmonisation 
programme appears to have encountered the principle of subsidiarity, and 
discovered that it has a problem. Certainly there has been little 
development in this area since the passing of the Maastricht treaty. The 
second area of European Corporate law requires some examination. The 
area of European Corporate structures, such as the existing European 
Economic Interest Groupings, or the proposed Societas Europea or 
European Company, has added a radical new dimension to, not only 
Corporate Law, but to European Law in general. Legal entities are being 
developed, which while requiring the jurisdiction of one member state to 
give them birth, once in existence, appear to inhabit a new legal 
jurisdiction, the supranational jurisdiction of the EC, and thereby exhibit 
capabilities, such as free movement, not available to legal entities more 
closely tied to a national jurisdiction. The ties with national jurisdictions 
have not been completely severed, but have been greatly loosened, and 
the potential impact of development of the current concepts could lead to 
a radical transformation of the European Corporate landscapes, 
particularly with regard to transnational corporations. Equally, as the 
European Corporate structures are, by virtue of their nature, validly “by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by 
the Community”, they do not fall foul of the subsidiarity provisions. 
 
 
EEIGs  
 
 
One of these European structures is the EEIG, the European 
Economic Interest Grouping,71 is a new legal entity, which can be utilised 
by both individuals and corporate entities. Based on the French GIEs,72 
this is the first legal entity to be governed by a uniform set of community 
rules, regardless of in which member state it is incorporated. Equally, the 
EEIG could be incorporated in one Member State, and conduce business 
exclusively in another member state. The EEIG is a legal entity composed 
of members exhibiting “economic multinationality”, 73 i.e. conducting 
                                                          
71
 Introduced on the 25th July 1985 by Council Regulation (EEC) 2137/85, OJ L199, 31/7/85, page 1-9. 
72
 The most well known internationally being Airbus and Ariane Espace. 
73
“The European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) The First European Legal Vehicle for co-
operation between enterprises” by Dirk Van Gerven in “European Economic Interest Groupings – The 
 15 
business in two different member states of the EC, utilising the “siege 
real” test rather than the “siege statutare” test.74 A company, in order to 
be a member of an EEIG must both be incorporated in a member state of 
the EC, and have their central administration within the EC. For the 
benefit of German fiscal law, a distinction was been made between legal 
capacity of an EEIG, and legal personality. An EEIG has, under the 
regulation, legal capacity, but it is left to the individual member states to 
determine whether legal personality is to be granted. The UK 
implementing legislation75 provides that the EEIG is to be a body 
corporate, with many of the features of a partnership, without actually 
being recognised as a partnership. It is not recognised as a European 
Company. Equally, the objects of an EEIG are to be very different from 
either a company or a partnership, with the thorny issue of the non-
harmonisation of fiscal regimes being avoided, as the EEIG is transparent 
for tax purposes. While an EEIG is supposed to be set up to promote the 
interests of its members, and not with the purpose of making profits, it 
may make profits, which are only taxable in the hands of its members.76 
 
While there are many detailed provisions dealing with the nature 
and capacity of an EEIG, from a European Integration perspective, one of 
the most interesting aspects of an EEIG is its mobility. The EEIG is the 
only non-natural legal entity currently enabled to exercise the right of free 
movement ostensibly granted to all legal entities by the EC Treaty. Under 
Council Regulation 2137/85, it is possible to transfer the official address 
of an EEIG from one member state to another without having to go 
through any winding up or re-incorporation processes, even though the 
applicable law will change in the process. 
 
It is hoped that the creation of a legal entity utilising rules common 
to each Member State would enhance mobility of enterprises, albeit to a 
limited extent, together with “cross-frontier co-operation in the European 
Community”,77 thereby advancing the concept of a true single European 
market. This EEIG goes some way towards this objective while avoiding 
the problems being encountered by the proposed European Company, the 
“Societas Europea.” 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
EEC Regulation and its application in the Member States of the European Community”. Editors Dirk 
V.A. Gerven and Carel A.V. Aalders. Kluwer 1990. 
74
 As utilised by the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
75
 European Economic Interest Grouping Regulations 1989, SI 1989 No. 6380. 
76
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 73. 
77
 Ibid. 
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Societas Europea 
 
 
There is currently a proposal on the table for a European Company, 
otherwise known as a Societas Europea.78 The proposal is for a “free 
floating entity” not tied to the jurisdiction of any member state, but 
attached directly to the supra national jurisdiction created by the 
European Community.79 The proposal was originally put forward in 
1970, but due to the need to develop complex supporting mechanisms to 
enable such a legal entity to come into being, to include insolvency and 
taxation issues, the proposed Societas Europea is still on the drawing 
board. Like the proposed 5th directive, with respect to nationally based 
companies, the SE proposal utilises the worker participation model for 
corporate decision making. 
 
As the current proposals stand, while the supranational jurisdiction 
is to give the European Company validity, the details of how the entity is 
to operate will be left to individual member states to fill in. As it is 
proposed that the European Company would be able to exercise free 
movement within the EC, once created, this proposal would appear to 
give rise to at least 15 varieties of Societas Europea inhabiting the supra 
national legal jurisdiction of the EC. The possibility of a Delaware effect 
increases greatly with the development of such a concept, requiring some 
harmonisation of the underlying corporate tax regimes, in order to avoid 
distortions in the market. 
 
In contrast to the European Corporate harmonisation programme, 
there have been recent developments in the gestation of the SE. A 
Commission communication of the 14th November 1995 singled out the 
need to “re-examine the question of worker involvement in the European 
Company from a new angle”.80 This led to the setting up of an 
independent committee of experts, under Etienne Davignon,81 which 
issued the Davignon report82 in May 1997. This report recognised the 
ability of a successful SE to make a “major contribution to exploit more 
fully the potential of the European internal market and hence to making 
the European economy more competitive internationally”. The need for a 
                                                          
78
 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute of a European Company, OJ C 263 16.10.89, page 
41. 
79
 The mechanism of taxation of distributions from such a free floating entity would have to be 
addressed in order to make a Societas Europea an attractive vehicle for investment. 
80
 The Davignon Report, May 1997. 
81
 President of the Societe Generale de Belgique and former Vice-President of the European 
Commission. 
82
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg05/soc-dial/labour/davignon/davien.htm  
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trans-national legal entity recognised by EC law is identified as a result of 
the “increasing gap between economic reality and legal reality as far as 
companies with European dimensions are concerned”, giving rise to 
increasing complexity “particularly in terms of taxation and decision 
making structures.” 
 
The road for the successful birth of the SE is seen as keeping the 
SE independent from national corporate provisions, with a SE coming 
into being either; 
1. by way of the merger of two companies, 
2. the creation of a holding company, or, 
3. the creation of a joint subsidiary.  
 
The possibility of the transformation of a national company into a 
SE was not considered. It would appear therefore, that the committee of 
experts did not consider this to be a valid option. If an SE can be kept at 
arms length from national corporations, by permitting their creation in 
certain limited circumstances, then issues such as sufficient 
harmonisation of tax laws, etc., to facilitate the operation of the SE 
become less problematic. 
 
The thorny issue of worker participation is dealt with in detail in 
the Davignon report, with the suggestion that each SE should individually 
negotiate its own worker participation provisions, recognising that none 
of the currently conflicting national provisions on the issue should be 
made mandatory for a trans-national entity such as an SE. 
 
 
Current state of EC Law and the implications for 
doing business in Europe 
 
 
Despite the promise of the EC treaty to provide for the free 
movement of legal persons across borders, pursuant to Article 43, read in 
conjunction with Article 48, and the provision within Article 293 EC,83 
these promises have not yet been fulfilled by way of secondary 
legislation, as evidenced in the Daily Mail case.84 The corporate 
harmonisation programme initiated was ambitious in its objectives, but 
                                                          
83
 for procedures to retain “the legal personality” of a legal entity “in the event of transfer of their set 
from one country to another, and the possibility of mergers between companies or firms governed by 
the laws of different countries”. 
84
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 35. 
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not withstanding the legislation passed to date which has smoothed out 
some of the jarring differences between Member States, there is still “no 
possible means of transferring” the seat of a company from one 
jurisdiction to another, or to “merge with companies established in an 
other Member State, or to bid for another company under commonly 
agreed rules".85 
 
The European Corporate harmonisation programme has also been 
described as being “unification by a different name”,86 which, despite the 
fears of the Delaware effect, is not in compliance with the subsidiarity 
provisions enshrined within the EC treaty since 1992. While unification 
of EC corporate law may certainly “increase transparency and reduce 
transaction costs”87 this is not required by the internal market, nor 
provided for by the EC treaty. To the extent that the harmonisation 
programme is provided for, it is subject to the subsidiarity principle. 
Therefore companies operating solely within one jurisdiction with limited 
international business do not appear to be about to be subjected to further 
radical change by way of European corporate directive. 
 
A much more promising future can be envisaged for the supra 
national legal entities. The EEIGs have already proven popular in certain 
areas of activity, with support being afforded to them by the 
Commission88 under the REGIE programme.89 It is possible that the 
EEIG as currently constituted could be further exploited, and perhaps 
developed to cover other aspects of trans-national operations. 
 
The more challenging concept of the Societas Europea, on the 
other hand, while showing some conceptual development, may prove to 
be a long term goal, with issues such as underlying European Corporate 
Tax harmonisation being required, even to the limited extent of dealing 
solely with the supranational corporate entity. For businesses currently 
engaged in large scale European business the distortion between the 
“economic reality and legal reality” as a result of the increasingly 
complexity “particularly in terms of taxation and decision-making 
structures”90 will in the interim continue to be a fact of life, to the extent 
at least that an EEIG can not be utilised to remedy the situation. For 
corporate entities interested in pursuing the EEIG option, a visit the 
Commission’s web site is an essential starting point.  
                                                          
85
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 24. 
86
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 7, referring to Schmitthoff. 
87
 Op. Cit. Footnote no. 24. 
88
 By DG23, Enterprise Policy, Distributive Trades, Tourism and co-operatives. 
89
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 Davignon report, May 1997. 
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European Corporate Directives 
and UK implementing legislation. 
 
 
First Directive (Directive 68/151/EEC [1968] OJ L65/9) – public 
disclosure requirements.  
Companies Act 1985, s. 18, 35, 35A, 36C, 42, 351(1), (2), (5)(a), 711 and 
Sch. 22 – originally European Communities Act 1972, s. 9. 
 
Second directive (Directive 77/91/EEC [1977] OJ L26/1, amended by 
Directive 92/101, [1992] OJ L 347/64) – raising and maintenance and 
alteration of the capital of plc’s 
Certain rules requiring non-–discrimination as between shareholders and 
law requires that any new issues of shares must first be offered to the 
existing shareholders. 
Minimum share capital of Public Companies c. £17,500 sterling. 
Companies Act 1985, Pt. IV, V (except Ch. VIII) and VIII – formerly 
Companies Act 1980, Pt. I, II and III and Companies Act 1981, Pt. III. 
 
Third directive (Directive 78/855/EEC [1978] OJ L295/36) – Mergers 
and Acquisition of Companies. 
Companies (Mergers and Divisions) Regulations 1987 (SI 1987/1991) 
which inserted s. 427A into the Companies Act 1985. 
 
Fourth directive (Directive 78/660/EEC [1978] OJ L222/11, amended 
by Council directive of November 27, 1984 revising the amounts 
expressed in ECU in the Fourth Council Directive, Directive 84/569, 
[1984] OJ L314/28) – Standard balance sheet and profit and loss 
accounts. Minimum requirements re same to be noted to a Company’s 
annual report. 
Companies Act 1985 Pt. VII – formerly Companies Act 1981, Pt. I (see 
also Partnerships and Unlimited Companies (Accounts) Regulations 1993 
(SI 1993/1820). 
 
Fifth Draft Directive (Commission’s Third Amendment of November 
20, 1991, to the Proposal for a Fifth Directive [1991] OJ C321/9) seeks 
to regulate the structure of companies. Also question of worker 
supervision. Provides that all worker representatives are elected by 
secret ballot of the work force. 
 
Sixth directive (Directive 82/891/EEC [1982] OJ L378/47) – re 
dividing plc’s into different entities.  
 20 
Companies (Mergers and Divisions) Regulations 1987 (SI 1987/1991) 
which inserted s. 427A into the Companies Act 1985. 
 
Seventh directive (Directive 83/349/EEC [1983] OJ L193/1) – re 
consolidated accounts for groups of companies. 
Companies Act 1989, Pt. I amending Companies Act 1985, Pt. VII (see 
also Partnerships and Unlimited Companies (Accounts) Regulations 1993 
(SI 1993/1820). 
 
Eight directive (Directive 84/253/EEC OJ L126/20) – Re common 
standards for Auditors and auditing of companies. 
Companies Act 1989, Pt. II. 
 
Ninth (Pre – Draft) Directive – re transparency of relationships 
between enterprises. 
 
Tenth Draft Directive  (Commissions Proposal of January 8, 1985, 
[1985] OJ C23/11.)– Re transparency in mergers and acquisitions 
throughout the Community. Extends the application of the 3rd directive to 
cross border mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Eleventh directive (Directive 89/666, [1989] OJ L395/36)  
Companies Act 1985 (Disclosure of Branches and Bank Accounts) 
Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3178) and Overseas Companies and Credit 
and Financial Institutions (Branch Disclosure) Regulations 1992 (SI 
1992/3179) (also implemented bank branches directive (89/117)) – see 
pp. 3,788 and 3,790. 
 
Twelfth directive (Directive 89/667, [1989] OJ L395/40)  
Companies (Single Member Private Limited Companies) Regulations 
1992 (SI 1992/1699). 
 
Thirteenth Draft Directive – re take-overs Commission’s Proposal of 
February 16, 1989 ([1985] OJ C 64/8). 
 
See also the Accounts directives. 
